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PROSPECTS FOR A MULTILATERAL TAX
TREATY
Diane M. Ring*
I. INTRODUCTION
Victor Thuronyi's paper critically examines the potential
structure and prospects for a multilateral tax treaty. The sub-
ject is of pressing importance as many nations grapple with an
expanding network of trading partners and an array of serious
cross border tax questions that require more than bilateral
attention. The possibility of a multilateral treaty has been
raised before, but ultimately languished, primarily from con-
cerns of feasibility.1 Mr. Thuronyi seeks to confront those chal-
lenges of design and implementation directly, and to conceive
of a process that can facilitate the increased multilateral en-
gagement of nations and eventually produce a treaty. I too
share the sense that a strategically designed process can lead
nations to a level of interaction and substantive discourse that
might be impossible to achieve at the outset. That is, process
* The author is Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law School where
she currently teaches Taxation, International Aspects of U.S. Income Taxation, and
a seminar entitled Issues in International Taxation. Professor Ring is the co-au-
thor of several publications, including RISK-SHIFTING WITHIN A MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION: THE INCOHERENCE OF THE U.S. TAX REGIME, and ON THE FRONTIER
OF PROCEDURAL INNOVATION: ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS AND THE STRUGGLE
TO ALLOCATE INCOME FOR CROSS BORDER TAXATION. She is a graduate of Harvard
College and Harvard Law School.
1. See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral
Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INTL L. 1641 (2001). See also Rodler, Austria Proposes Multi-
lateral Tax Treaty, 97 TNI 183-2 (1997) (the Austrian Ministry of Finance advo-
cating pursuit of a multilateral tax treaty for the European Union, but noting that
prior efforts at a comprehensive multilateral tax treaty in the European context
failed); Daniel Berman, Part I: Departing U.S. Treasury Staffer Discusses Treaties,
15 TAX NOTES INTL 949, 951 (1997) [hereinafter Berman] (quoting departing Depu-
ty International Tax Counsel Daniel Berman, "It has not proven practical to have
a multilateral tax treaty ... because the tax systems in each country have a lot
of differences that you have to reflect in a bilateral negotiation."); Larry Pressler,
Comments on International Tax Treaties, 92 TNI 57-16 (1992) [hereinafter Pressler]
(Senator Larry Pressler's Senate floor statement noting concerns in the tax context
that "countries find it much more difficult to reach agreement on a common
goal .... The interests of each nation result in unique approaches to the deter-
mination of revenue requirements, the ability to raise taxes and indeed, to the
kinds of taxes upon which its system will depend.").
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can shape behavior and expectations, and can build skills,
networks, and ideas.
A plan for multilateral tax treaties and the ensuing inter-
actions among countries raises two distinct issues: (1) the sub-
stantive desirability of varying degrees of "cooperation," and (2)
practical problems and barriers to overcome in designing a
process leading to multilateral tax agreements. Mr. Thuronyi's
paper focuses almost exclusively on the second issue in an
effort to respond to the traditional complaints about feasibility.
The end result is a procedural framework which, in the short
term, provides: A universal template for bilateral tax treaties;
common language, terminology, and interpretations; persuasive
influence through a single document; and mini-multilateral
agreements. The longer term goals include: Developing suffi-
cient comfort with a multilateral structure such that there will
be a shift away from bilateral treaties toward wider partici-
pation in a multilateral treaty; expanding the subject matter
coverage of treaties to include those issues not addressed cur-
rently in treaties; and possibly increasing the uniformity of
countries' domestic rules and definitions.
II. Focus ON THE PROCEDURAL MECHANISM
The decision to tackle procedural issues independent of the
substantive treaty tax questions charts a reasonable path.
Different countries, scholars, and taxpayers may have diver-
gent views about the appropriate responses to tax questions'
and about which questions hold the most promise for multilat-
eral agreement. However, irrespective of the particular an-
swers to substantive questions, we must establish a framework
for approaching such issues in a manner conducive to produc-
tive and continuing interaction. Another reason to focus on the
procedural side of multilateral cooperation is the recognition
that a frontal assault on the central substantive questions
regarding the ultimate scope of a multilateral endeavor easily
2. See, e.g., Pressler, supra note 1; Joel Slemrod, Tax Principles in an Inter-
national Economy, in WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11, 21 (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr. eds.,
1990) ("In the case of tax policy, countries differ enormously in their revenue re-
quirements, capacity to raise taxes, and their predisposition toward alternative tax
systems, including the perceived need to use tax policy to affect economic activi-
ty.").
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could derail progress. In contrast, an agreement to establish a
process and structure for more modest, circumscribed purposes
might be acceptable and yet lead to more comprehensive ac-
cords.
Despite the logic and compelling practicality of divorcing
the substance from the process, the separation is not entirely
possible. We should be aware of the intersection of the two
when trying to anticipate objections and accurately assess the
nature of potential resistance to Mr. Thuronyi's proposal. Evi-
dence of the intersection first comes from the justifications for
a multilateral approach, such as the existing substantive tax
problems that require resolution on more than an individual or
bilateral basis.' Even if Mr. Thuronyi's short term agenda
described above does not encompass some of these problems,
they nonetheless motivate the argument for increased multilat-
eral interaction.4 Implicit in the push for multilateral treaties
3. Such income tax issues include cross border tax competition, apportion-
ment of the income of multi-nationals, treaty overlap, and electronic commerce.
See, e.g., Adrian J. Sawyer, Electronic Commerce: International Policy Implications
for Revenue Authorities and Governments, 19 VA. TAX REV. 73, 96 (1999) (examin-
ing Australia's efforts in taxation of electronic commerce and observing that
"[i]nternational cooperation is paramount given the lack of constraint on transac-
tions posed by geographical boundaries . . . . [t]his situation highlights the need
for international cooperation through a multilateral agreement or treaty."); Joseph
Guttentag, Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Tax Affairs,
"Statement at Finance Committee Hearing on Internet," 137 DTR L-1 (July 17,
1998) ("Close cooperation and mutual assistance are necessary between the United
States and all of our trading partners to ensure that international policies regard-
ing the Internet and electronic commerce are consistent and do not lead to multi-
ple or discriminatory taxation of electronic commerce or the Internet."); Arthur J.
Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce
Business Profits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 133, 165 (1999) (asserting that "[slignificant
international cooperation will be required to confront the challenges posed by the
taxation of e-commerce" but lamenting the lack of an international entity like the
World Trade Organization (WTO) for tax given the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development's (OECD) general restrictions on working only with
members); IFA Panel Sketches Solutions to Triangular Tax Treaty Problems, 98
TNI 196-2 (1998) (during International Fiscal Association panel, Joseph Schuch of
the Department of Austrian and International Tax Law observed that, "[tihese
triangular treaty problems emphasize the importance of moving to multilateral tax
treaties."); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1675 (2000) ("[a] multilateral
solution [to the issue of tax competition] . . . is therefore essential if the funda-
mental goals of taxation are to be preserved.").
4. The other major justification outlined in the paper leans more toward the
"purely" process side-the practical difficulty of updating many treaties on a regu-
lar basis.
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and expanded treaty coverage is an expectation regarding the
substantive scope of these agreements, even if the particular
details remain entirely open. Thus, we cannot escape the exis-
tence of powerful substantive convictions driving the multilat-
eral campaign by devoting our exclusive attention to process.
The second problem with attempting to focus exclusively
on the process side emerges from the harmonization that the
paper anticipates from the pursuit of a multilateral treaty
process.5 The quest for a new or expanded process for multilat-
eral agreement presumably is premised on the view that a
significant amount of coordination and harmonization will
follow-otherwise the effort would not be worthwhile. Mr.
Thuronyi clearly articulates this goal but refrains from out-
lining the content of the harmonization.6 Unfortunately, such
restraint cannot eliminate sufficiently the concerns of countries
uncertain about the degree of harmonization they seek. Howev-
er, the existence of harmonization concerns does not indicate a
failing in the procedural design; it simply reflects the fact that
countries do understand the general direction in which a mul-
tilateral effort would lead and that the direction inherently
involves more coordination than currently exists. Moreover, the
acknowledgment of these concerns does not diminish the im-
portance of a carefully designed process for harnessing
countries' attention and energies for resolution of tax issues.
Even though the substantive issues underlying multilateral
treaties cannot be separated thoroughly from the procedural
framework, a well designed process which is attentive to
countries' reservations and which is introduced with limited
nascent goals (but prospects for more ambitious ones) remains
critical.
Finally, the procedural/substantive line blurs in the deci-
sions that will be necessary regarding power and voting rules
of the entity ultimately selected to oversee the multilateral
treaty.7 The power and voting structure will dictate, to an
extent, what kinds of agreements are possible or likely, and
5. To some degree this observation just amplifies the first point-even with-
out defining the specific substance of a multilateral treaty, the ultimate object
remains agreement and thus some level of harmonization.
6. See Thuronyi, supra note 1, at 1641.
7. This point holds for whatever organization--existing, new, or modi-
fied-that is selected to serve the function of coordinating the multilateral tax
treaty.
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whether countries will be sufficiently comfortable to partici-
pate. These observations on the prospects of encouraging a
multilateral treaty through the thoughtful crafting of a process
with incremental goals merely highlight the fact that even
such modest efforts must confront and incorporate substantive
tax concerns of target nations.
III. THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED PLAN
Once we decide to encourage the development of multilat-
eral tax treaties, the particulars of the procedural structure
assume a serious role. Mr. Thuronyi offers a somewhat flexible
picture of the organization and process that could support this
mission.' In an effort to identify potential sources of difficulty
that might be avoided or at least anticipated, I would like to
offer a few comments on the voting structure and power of the
selected organization. First, although changing or updating one
multilateral treaty generally might be easier than updating
many bilateral treaties,9 the process of changing the multilat-
eral treaty might move more slowly depending on the type of
action or vote necessary to achieve change in the multilateral
forum. For example, a new provision such as "treaty shop-
ping"' might be easier to introduce initially in a few treaties,
and once established and proven desirable could become widely
adopted. In contrast, if ex ante the agreement of a large group
of nations were necessary to introduce the new provision, then
adoption could take a long time, especially without a trial
version to observe.
A general example of this phenomenon occurred with the
Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) program. When the United
States introduced this program in the early 1990s to cope with
the allocation of income from cross border transactions ("trans-
fer pricing"), many countries were quite suspicious of the Unit-
8. The flexibility derives from the desire to distance the framework from the
potentially contentious substantive questions.
9. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1, at 952 (departing Deputy International
Tax Counsel Daniel Berman commenting, "The principal problem in using a [bi-
lateral] treaty to combat abuse is the time element. It just takes too long to nego-
tiate a treaty, to get a treaty into force . . . [and] it's very unusual to go back in
and fix up that treaty in the near term.").
10. See, e.g., Tax Convention with the Netherlands, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth.,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-6 (1992).
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ed States' motives and of the likely results of such agree-
ments." Nevertheless, the United States initiated the process
and pursued agreements involving one or two other countries.
Over time, many more countries began participating in the
APA process and developed programs of their own.' If the
United States had needed to obtain the up-front support of a
large number of countries before starting the APA process, it
seems unlikely that such support could have been garnered as
quickly as it was under the more incremental country by coun-
try method that emerged. 3 The prospect of delay in securing
agreement from many nations would not be a problem for the
preliminary treaty framework Mr. Thuronyi proposes. At the
outset, the "multilateral" treaty merely serves as a template
which countries freely can modify in their actual, binding,
bilateral treaties. However, the reservations about the ease of
treaty modification cannot be dismissed completely. A chief
benefit of the template treaty derives from its role as a precur-
sor to true multilateral treaties for which this question of inno-
vation and flexibility is quite salient.
My second comment reflects the concern that the voting
structure either will inhibit innovation or raise sovereignty
concerns. If the voting structure of the multilateral organiza-
tion developing the template, and ultimately promoting the
11. See Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advance
Pricing Agreements and the Struggle to Allocate Income For Cross Border Taxation,
21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, n.130-131 (2000).
12. Id. at n.127.
13. It is possible that some countries perceived their participation in the APA
process to be less than voluntary-that is, if some type of pricing agreement is
underway (especially if it involves two other countries) then failure to become
involved may put you at a disadvantage despite the existence of domestic transfer
pricing rules that always can be enforced. Comparable versions of this problem
initially arose in the design of the basic transfer pricing regimes. Other countries
perceived the United States' move toward more serious penalties and documenta-
tion requirements for transfer pricing as putting extra pressure on taxpayers not
to understate their U.S. taxable income. See Ring, supra note 11, at 143, 157-58.
Thus, to the extent tax burdens in two countries were relatively comparable, tax-
payers had an incentive to price the transactions more favorable toward the Unit-
ed States (i.e., more profit appearing in the U.S. side of the related party transac-
tion) so as to reduce or eliminate the likelihood that the United States would
pursue a transfer pricing claim on audit. In response to the effects of this U.S.
pressure, other countries implemented their own transfer pricing penalties in order
to discourage taxpayers from placing too much income in the United States simply
to reduce audit and penalty. Now taxpayers would face comparable enforcement
"risk" in both countries.
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multilateral treaty, requires less than consensus (perhaps in
an effort to increase the likelihood of bold innovations being
pursued), then countries may be wary of the loss of control
over fiscal affairs. 4 Whether a non-consensus rule (such as
majoritarian vote) applied only for establishing and revising
the treaty or also applied in dispute resolution, countries may
question the risks of surrendering these issues to majoritarian
international vote. Alternatively, if the organization adopted a
consensus voting model 5 to reduce countries' concern over
fiscal control, the real risk becomes not one of undesirable
action, but of utter non-action because of the difficulty in per-
suading a larger group as described above. No ideal voting
structure exists. Yet, we have managed to craft functional
multilateral agreements and bodies in a variety of fields. Thus,
the inability to develop a voting structure that fully guarantees
fiscal autonomy and fully promotes innovation should not sig-
nal impossibility for multilateral tax treaties. It does, however,
demonstrate the significance of the voting structure in both
meeting the goals of multilateral cooperation and addressing
the worries of potential participants. Perhaps the staggered
approach Mr. Thuronyi outlines (first the template, and even-
tually multilateral treaties) will be an adequate compromise.
Little autonomy is sacrificed initially, and as more serious
14. In the context of the European Union, the United Kingdom has expressed
its commitment to retaining "its veto over tax matters, which it believes reflects
national values and the choices made at a national level." Joann M. Weiner, EU
Leaders Debate Qualified Majority Voting at Nice Summit, 21 TAX NOTES INT'L
2647 (2000).
15. International organizations use a variety of methods, and continue to ex-
periment. For example, GATT traditionally functioned on a consensus basis. Thus,
a panel to adjudicate a complaint could be established only with the support of all
members, including the defendant country. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
tions, however, established procedures which require a panel to be designated
upon receipt of a complaint unless there is a consensus not to do so (i.e., only if
the complaining party agrees not to move forward). See Robert A. Green,
Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disiiutes Between Governments: A Compari-
son of the International Tax and Trade Regimes, 23 YALE J. INTL L. 79, 83-84 &
n.13 (1998). In the context of the European Union, tax policy decisions require a
unanimous vote, making it difficult to effect change. See EU Tax Commissioner
Supports Proposed E-Commerce VAT Amendment, 2000 WTD 183-12 (Sept. 20,
2000) (EU Tax Commissioner Frits Bolkestein identifying the voting difficulties in
the European Union for tax, and thus explaining the Commission's proposal that a
"Qualified Majority Voting" should be approved for certain tax matters-while
keeping "key decisions under the unanimity rule in a effort to prevent any eroding
of national sovereignty.").
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steps toward a single treaty are taken, time remains to reeval-
uate whatever voting structure has been implemented. In addi-
tion, incrementalism gives the organization an opportunity to
grow and develop its own patterns, norms, and historical prac-
tices which might raise countries' comfort level with assigning
increased power to the group.
The third issue regards -the organization selected as the
locus of power and deliberation for the multilateral treaty
project. Mr. Thuronyi offers several possibilities including the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or offshoots of
either. In keeping with his desire to focus on the core design
questions and the developmental path multi-national interac-
tion can take, he leaves the final selection of organization to
the political choice of nations. 6 Of course, countries and orga-
nizations are not clean slates. For example, to the extent that
countries are wary of a WTO type authority for tax matters,"
a WTO based organization might be less acceptable even if the
details of power and decision making in this forum differ from
standard WTO practice. Forum preferences poses an empirical
question about nations' perceptions of existing organizations.
Ultimately, the hardest problem may be pitching the pro-
posed treaty reform as neither too revolutionary nor too incre-
mental. The project could be viewed as too ambitious because
it truly constitutes a call for a multilateral treaty and harmo-
nization (both harmonization of treaty terms made available to
different countries, and harmonization of the different
countries' domestic tax systems)-thereby fueling substantive
and political objections to the prospect. Alternatively, the pro-
posal could be viewed as too little change (as Mr. Thuronyi
suggests, the OECD basically accomplishes the initial stage of
this work-the template fimction-now)" and hence not worth
16. An organization with a global scope would be central. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah,
supra note 3, at 1675 (a multilateral approach to tax competition requires an
organization "with an equally global reach [that] can regulate or tax private mar-
ket activity"); Cockfield, supra note 3, at 165 (noting desirability of a WTO like
organization for resolution of electronic commerce issues, given the OECD's limited
membership).
17. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1, at 951 (quoting departing Deputy Inter-
national Tax Counsel Daniel Berman, "The tax authorities of the world have not
accepted the World Trade Organization as a player in the area of tax policy or
tax administration. Its just a trade organization.").
18. Thuronyi, supra note 1, at 1641. See also Chang Hee Lee, Impact of E.
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the effort or the political capital. That is, the very reason the
proposal might be considered acceptable is that in theory it
demands little from countries. Thus, the challenge for those
promoting reform is to persuasively walk the line between
these two characterizations.
IV. CONCLUSION: FINAL THOUGHTS
The proposal for multilateral cooperation starts with trea-
ty reform (templates followed by multilateral treaties) and
considers focused topical agreements as a subsequent possibili-
ty once the procedural framework and treaty reforms are in
place. However, it might be possible, and perhaps preferable,
to reverse the order. To the extent that part of the serious
impetus for treaty reform comes from the substantive areas
where solutions demand multilateral attention, perhaps we
should start with multilateral agreements limited to these
prominent topics. If significant political will proves necessary
to initiate a multilateral treaty process, then it may make
sense to direct that energy and attention not to the general
operation, maintenance, and development of the treaty net-
work, but instead to the specific questions and problems most
likely to undermine the international tax system in the near
future.19 The recent efforts of the OECD regarding tax compe-
tition indicate the plausibility of an issue-focused approach.0
Regardless of whether we pursue an issue specific agree-
ment or the general treaty regime first, serious attention must
Commerce on Allocation of Tax Revenue Between Developed and Developing Coun-
tries, 18 TAX NOTES INTL 2569 (1999) (noting most tax treaties have followed the
OECD model and have been negotiated bilaterally, although "the treaty network
over the world virtually has resulted in a global multilateral treaty with a very
complex set of reservations by each participant.").
19. Of course, the sensitivity of these topics (for which countries might per-
ceive the benefits of multilateral engagement, but nonetheless find agreement
elusive) could reduce the likelihood of immediate success. In that case, the treaty
template could be the better option-pitched as a streamlining first step. The
advisability of initially targeting either the treaty process or the topical agree-
ments turns on political and empirical information.
20. Depending on one's perspective, the recent OECD work in tax competition
represents an example of countries recognizing a shared issue and jointly working
toward a resolution that demands extensive multilateral cooperation, or highlights
the difficulty and careful incremental work necessary to move so many countries
in the same direction. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING
GLOBAL ISSUE (1998).
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be given to the primary reservation voiced about multilateral
tax treaties-sovereignty.2' Similar questions about sovereign-
ty arose with the OECD work on tax competition.22 Countries
value their ability to make individual negotiations and draft
domestic tax policy suitable to their needs. Grants of tax power
to an international organization threaten such sovereignty.
Careful consideration of these concerns can offer insights into
how to make this political move successful. Unlike trade is-
sues, where national and international interests are thought to
coincide more regularly,' tax matters are less determinate.
Although we should not overstate the likely differences be-
tween national and international goals (for example, the com-
monality of the existing treaty network demonstrates a notable
degree of convergence of goals and methods), two special as-
pects of tax deserve comment. First, though trade policy is cen-
tral to a national government, the tax system funds the gov-
ernment as well as provides a policy mechanism. Second, the
historical and cultural views about the role of taxation (espe-
cially in the United States) and the exercise of the taxing pow-
er must be acknowledged.
As Mr. Thuronyi describes at the outset, the question
reduces to a political one; how to achieve increased coopera-
tion. A variety of choices emerge from the different levels of
the proposed plan. First, an entity for this activity must be
designated-it could be an existing organization, a spin off, or
an entirely new body. Second, a voting structure for the organi-
zation must be selected, recognizing that it directly will influ-
ence the organization's appeal and plausible actions. Third,
different voting rules could apply for different steps or acts
such as initial enactment, revision, and enforcement. Finally,
the initial step taken by this organized multilateral effort
could be reform of the treaty network as proposed by Mr.
21. See, e.g., Pressler, supra note 1; Slemrod, supra note 2, at 21 ("ceding tax
policy-making authority to an international agreement would compromise national
sovereignty too greatly" for it to be a realistic option). See also supra note 13.
22. See, e.g., Daniel Mitchell, An OECD Proposal to Eliminate Tax Competition
Would Mean Higher Taxes and Less Privacy, 21 TAX NOTES INTL 1799 (2000)
(arguing that the OECD's recommended action for tax competition "contradicts
international norms and threatens the ability of sovereign countries to determine
their own fiscal affairs.").
23. See, e.g., Slemrod, supra note 2, at 21 ("a clear benchmark goal, of zero
tariffs" exists in the trade context).
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Thuronyi, or, alternatively, could be the pursuit of targeted
topical reform. All of these choices, when taken together, either
will enable proponents of a multilateral system to successfully
navigate political and policy pitfalls, or will force the otherwise
inevitable foundering of such an enterprise on the rocky shores
of national self-interest and bilateral suspicion. While Victor
Thuronyi's mission is a bold one, the simple saying still ap-
plies. Here, in tax, as elsewhere, the devil is in the details.
Ironically, it may be that our sometimes frustrating experience
with bilateral regimes will provide us with some keys to multi-
lateral success.
